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This paper addresses the manner in which alterations of interpersonal expe-
rience are (a) central to most of those predicaments labelled as depression, 
and (b) inextricable from other, seemingly distinct depression-symptoms. I 
sketch an approach inspired by the phenomenological tradition of philosophy, 
which emphasizes how depression-experiences involve profound changes in 
ones sense of possibility. In so doing, I show how anticipated and actual 
interactions with other people shape and re-shape experience of the wider 
world by imbuing it with certain distinctive types of possibility. It follows 
from this that a shift in how one anticipates, experiences, and relates to other 
people in general also amounts to a shift in the types of possibility offered by 
the world. My discussion is concerned primarily with the structure of depres-
sion-experiences, rather than with causes or treatment. However, I conclude 
by tentatively addressing some implications for the latter.
Keywords: depression; existential feeling; interpersonal connection; isola-
tion; phenomenology; possibility; self-regulation
1. Introduction
Changes in the structure of interpersonal experience are central to most of those 
predicaments labelled as depression. Furthermore, various other depression 
symptoms cannot be adequately conceived of in isolation from the interpersonal. 
However, one can be forgiven for thinking otherwise. Consider, for instance, the 
GLDJQRVWLFFULWHULDIRUµPDMRUGHSUHVVLYHGLVRUGHU¶LQ'60,WLVVWDWHGWKDW¿YH
(or more) of nine symptoms must be present, including at least one of two core 
symptoms (depressed mood and loss of interest) and others from a list of seven 
(weight and or appetite changes; sleep disturbance; activity changes; fatigue; 
worthlessness and/or guilt; lack of concentration; thoughts of death or suicide). 
Interpersonal relations are not explicitly mentioned at all (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013, pp. 160, 161). Granted, persistent feelings of worthlessness 
and guilt do at least point towards a wider change in how one relates to others. 
However, its nature is not addressed and, in any case, the presence of such feel-
ings is not essential to the diagnosis. We are thus left with the impression that any 
disturbances in the interpersonal realm are effects of depression symptoms: social 
relations are impaired because the person is depressed. This is illustrative of a 
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wider tendency to think of depression, and psychiatric illness more generally, as 
a disorder of the individual.1
,QFRQWUDVW¿UVWSHUVRQDFFRXQWVRIGHSUHVVLRQFRQVLVWHQWO\FRQYH\WKHFHQ-
trality of interpersonal experience. Consider the following excerpt, from a depres-
sion memoir by Tracy Thompson:
I wanted a connection I couldnt have; I did not understand or value the ones I did 
have. It was a story I saw time and time again in the ward. Only connect! E. M. 
Forster had written, but we hadnt, or couldnt, or never had. There was the doctor, 
ORVWLQKLVSHUVRQDOWRUPHQWRU+HDWKHUJUDVSLQJIRUVXSHU¿FLDOV\PEROVRIFRQQHFW-
HGQHVVRU/XLVDORRNLQJIRULWWKURXJKVH[,WVHHPHGWRPHWKHEDVLFGH¿QLWLRQRI
any mental illness, this persistent, painful inability to simply be with someone else: 
It might be lifelong. Or it might descend like a sudden catastrophe, this blankness 
between ourselves and the rest of the world. The blankness might not even be ob-
vious to others. But on our side of that severed connection, it was hell, a life lived 
behind glass. The only difference between mild depression and severe schizophrenia 
was the amount of sound and air that seeped in. (Thompson, 1995, pp. 199, 200)2
That is my focus here: an inability to be with other people in a certain way. We 
might be sceptical about the reliability of certain sources of testimony, such as 
depression memoirs and we should certainly be wary of cursory remarks about the 
differences between depression and schizophrenia. Nevertheless, what Thompson 
writes is, in my opinion, broadly right. Other depression memoirs similarly 
emphasize this inability to connect. For example, Sally Brampton (2008, p. 1) 
writes, If we connect with even one other human being who truly understands, 
we take one step out of the illness. Life is about connection. There is nothing else. 
'HSUHVVLRQLVWKHRSSRVLWHLWLVDQLOOQHVVGH¿QHGE\DOLHQDWLRQ¶)XUWKHUPRUHWKH
WKHPHRISDLQIXOGLVFRQQHFWLRQIURPRWKHUVLVQRWVSHFL¿FWRSXEOLVKHGPHPRLUV
LWLVMXVWDVSURPLQHQWLQDOPRVWHYHU\GHWDLOHG¿UVWSHUVRQDFFRXQWRIGHSUHVVLRQ
regardless of source. In what follows, I will illustrate my various points by quot-
ing from responses to a questionnaire study that I conducted with colleagues in 
2011. (Unless otherwise indicated, testimonies quoted here were acquired via this 
study. Most of the respondents whom I quote from had diagnoses of major depres-
sion. In other instances, the experiences described are equally consistent with 
that diagnosis. For full details of the study, see Ratcliffe, 2015). There remains 
the concern that over-reliance on one source of testimony has its limitations and 
presents a number of interpretive challenges. However, the kinds of descriptions 
RIIHUHGE\UHVSRQGHQWVDUHFRQVLVWHQWZLWK¿UVWSHUVRQDFFRXQWVPRUHJHQHUDOO\
as is their emphasis on the interpersonal.
I will not speculate as to the causes of depression, even though many people 
do attribute their depression to sequences of unpleasant circumstances involving 
other people, often dating back to childhood. Instead, my emphasis is on the rele-
vant phenomenology: on what the experience of social isolation actually consists 
of and how it relates to other, seemingly distinct aspects of depression. It is easy 
enough to illustrate that interpersonal experience is central to depression, regard-
less of what diagnostic manuals and the like might suggest. But there remains the 
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temptation to construe it as an isolable symptom amongst others. What I want to 
show here is exactly how the interpersonal is integrated into a wider experience 
of depression (or, to put it more accurately, how it is integrated into wider expe-
riences of the kind(s) that are often associated with the label depression and, 
PRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\µPDMRUGHSUHVVLRQ¶0\DSSURDFKGUDZVRQWKHSKHQRPHQRORJ-
ical tradition of philosophy, which I think is especially well-placed to clarify the 
QDWXUHRIWKHUHOHYDQWH[SHULHQFHVJLYHQLWVGLVWLQFWLYHHPSKDVLVRQKRZZH¿QG
ourselves situated in a world. With this emphasis, I will suggest, we can come to 
see exactly howWKHLQWHUSHUVRQDO¿WVLQ
It is debatable whether and to what extent the kinds of approaches advocated 
by phenomenological philosophers are compatible with one or another conception 
of psychoanalysis and with wider therapeutic practice. I will not try to tackle this 
set of issues here. However, I should at least stress that the account of depres-
sion and interpersonal experience laid out in what follows does not require the 
acceptance of any particular phenomenological method and is potentially com-
patible with a broadly psychoanalytic perspective. My aim here is to provide a 
framework for conceptualizing certain commonplace symptoms, one that has 
the potential to inform a wide range of therapeutic approaches. Furthermore, a 
phenomenological approach that emphasizes interpersonal dynamics, rather than 
just subjective experience, is especially well placed to enter into dialogue with 
psychoanalysis. In this respect, my phenomenological analysis is consistent with 
certain recent attempts to integrate phenomenological and psychodynamic per-
spectives (Stolorow, 2013; Throop, 2012).
2. Possibilities
$FRPPRQWKHPHLQ¿UVWSHUVRQDFFRXQWVRIGHSUHVVLRQLVWKDWRWKHUSHRSOHGRQRW
understand ones predicament, cannot understand it, or do not even try to under-
stand it. Accompanying this is the acknowledgement that depression, or some 
DVSHFWRILWLVH[WUHPHO\GLI¿FXOWRUHYHQLPSRVVLEOHWRGHVFULEH
I think the feeling of being paralyzed by the depression is hard to explain, as its hard 
to explain it to myself.
7KHGLVFRQQHFWLRQ,IHHOLVWKHPRVWGLI¿FXOWWRFRQYH\,W¶VYHU\GLI¿FXOWWRH[SODLQ
to others who have never felt it, that the world looks distorted and imposing and 
alien, and that I dont have a place in it. Its like being in a bubble with no sound or 
colour, and a complete lack of familiarity in everything, even in places I know well, 
like my home. Even people seem very alien.
Being unable to convey ones predicament to others and feeling that nobody 
gets it are not simply consequences of being depressed. They are integral to a 
more general feeling of social alienation that is itself central to many depression- 
H[SHULHQFHV%XWZK\GRSHRSOH¿QGWKHVHH[SHULHQFHVVRGLI¿FXOWWRDUWLFXODWH"
Granted, it could be that depression impairs the required cognitive abilities. 
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However, those who have recovered from depression often state that it remains 
GLI¿FXOWRULPSRVVLEOHWRGHVFULEH$OWKRXJKWKHGLI¿FXOW\PD\ZHOOEHDWWULEXW-
able to a range of factors, a prominent and consistent theme is that depression 
involves the profound, all-enveloping transformation of a world that was pre-
YLRXVO\WDNHQIRUJUDQWHGRIVRPHWKLQJWKDWSHRSOHVHOGRPUHÀHFWXSRQRUHYHQ
acknowledge in other circumstances:
You know that you have lost life itself. Youve lost a habitable earth. Youve lost the 
invitation to live that the universe extends to us at every moment. Youve lost some-
thing that people dont even know is. Thats why its so hard to explain. (Quoted by 
Hornstein, 2009, p. 213)
Most of all I was terribly alone, lost, in a harsh and far-away place, a horrible ter-
rain reserved for me alone. There was nowhere to go, nothing to see, no panorama. 
Though this landscape surrounded me, vast and amorphous, I couldnt escape the 
DZIXOFRQ¿QHVRIP\OHDGHQERG\DQGGRZQFDVWH\H6KDZ1997, p. 40)
The phenomenological tradition is a valuable resource for understanding, given 
WKLV DOWHUDWLRQ RI µZRUOG¶ +RZ ZH ¿QG RXUVHOYHV URRWHG LQ D ZRUOG DQG KRZ
world-experience differs qualitatively from any attitude adopted towards some-
thing within a world are consistent themes in phenomenology. Whenever I per-
ceive p, remember q, think about r, believe that s, or imagine t , DOUHDG\¿QG
myself situated in a world, in a realm where it is possible to take up attitudes 
of these and other types. Because the relevant aspect of experience is so per-
vasive and deep-rooted, it is something that we seldom explicitly acknowledge. 
What is thus needed is a perspectival shift, whereby world ceases to operate 
DVDSUHUHÀHFWLYHEDFNJURXQGWRRXUWKRXJKWVLQFOXGLQJRXUWKRXJKWVDERXWWKH
nature of human experience) and instead becomes an object of inquiry. Here is 
how Edmund Husserl puts it, in one of his later writings:
Waking life is always a directedness toward this or that, being directed toward it as 
an end or as means, as relevant or irrelevant, toward the interesting or the indifferent, 
toward the private or public, toward what is daily required or intrusively new. All 
this lies within the world-horizon; but special motives are required when one who is 
gripped in this world-life reorients himself and somehow comes to make the world 
itself thematic, to take up a lasting interest in it. (1954/1970, p. 281)
My suggestion is that the world that is altered in depression corresponds roughly 
to the experiential world that phenomenology seeks to investigate. Hence, we 
can draw on insights from phenomenology in order to characterize something that 
LVRWKHUZLVHHOXVLYH7RGRVRZH¿UVWUHTXLUHDPRUHVSHFL¿FDFFRXQWRIZKDW
this world actually consists of. Importantly, it is quite unlike any experience of 
or thought about something within the world. The world is not taken to be the case 
in the same manner as an object of perception or belief. Its acceptance is instead 
a precondition for attitudes of believing, perceiving, and so forth. In order to 
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take something to be the case, not the case, or possibly the case, one must already 
be situated in a realm where some things are and others are not. So one does not 
GLVFRYHUWKLVZRUOGDVDQREMHFWRIH[SHULHQFHRUWKRXJKW5DWKHURQH¿QGVRQH-
self practically, habitually, affectively immersed in it.
7KHQDWXUHRI WKLV µLPPHUVLRQ¶FDQEHGHVFULEHGPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\$QRWKHU
consistent theme in the phenomenological tradition is the way experience incor-
porates possibilityDQGPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\anticipation. All experience is said to be 
permeated by possibilities of various kinds. For instance, when I look at a cup, it 
appears as something that I could see from another angle, reach out and touch, or 
drink from. Some experienced possibilities are perceptual in nature: I could reach 
out and touch it; by moving this way, I could see the other side of it. However, 
others relate to goal-directed activities and involve various types of VLJQL¿FDQFH or 
mattering. My computer, desk, chair and pile of notes are experienced as matter-
ing in an integrated way, insofar as they all relate to my current project of writing 
an academic paper. The long list of emails in my inbox, in contrast, is experienced 
as an obstruction to other pursuits that I am preoccupied with, even as a potential 
WKUHDWWRP\ZHOOEHLQJ0DQ\H[SHULHQFHGSRVVLELOLWLHVFRQVLVWPRUHVSHFL¿FDOO\
in immediate anticipation, in a sense of what is coming next and how it matters. 
Anticipation of this kind is not separate from our experience of the actual. Rather, 
the actual is imbued with salient possibilities. Take the case of watching a glass 
IDOOIURPDWDEOHWRZDUGVDKDUGÀRRU7KHSURVSHFWRILWVVKDWWHULQJDQGPDNLQJD
certain noise is there, now, as it falls.
Importantly, our anticipation of unfolding events is not atomistic in structure. 
Anticipatory experience has what we might call an overarching style, a cohesive 
way in which ones situation as a whole is experienced as unfolding. The sense of 
EHLQJVLWXDWHGLQWKHZRUOGLVWREHLGHQWL¿HGZLWKWKLVVW\OH
The natural world is the horizon of all horizons, and the style of all styles, which 
ensures my experiences have a given, not a willed, unity beneath all of the ruptures 
of my personal and historical life; the counterpart of the natural world is the given, 
general, and pre-personal existence in me of my sensory functions, which is where 
ZHGLVFRYHUHGWKHGH¿QLWLRQRIWKHERG\0HUOHDX3RQW\1945/2012, p. 345)
As this quotation suggests, it can be added that a style of perceptual and practical 
unfolding is inseparable from diffuse sets of felt bodily dispositions. It is through 
WKHIHHOLQJERG\WKDWZHH[SHULHQFHWKHVLJQL¿FDQWSRVVLELOLWLHVRIIHUHGE\RXUVXU-
roundings (Ratcliffe, 2008, 2015, 2017a). To make things clearer, consider more 
ORFDOL]HGIHHOLQJVRISUDFWLFDOFRQ¿GHQFH)RULQVWDQFHVXSSRVHRQHLVJLYLQJD
well-prepared lecture to a group of interested students, while feeling unusually 
refreshed and healthy. Ones experience of the situation as a whole is characterized 
E\WKHFRQ¿GHQWXQSUREOHPDWLFDQWLFLSDWLRQDQGIXO¿OPHQWRIYDULRXVVLJQL¿FDQW
possibilities. Of course, what one anticipates can be quite indeterminate in nature. 
(YHQVRH[SHULHQFHXQIROGVLQOLQHZLWKZKDWLVDQWLFLSDWHGLWGRHVQRWFRQÀLFW
with it. When surprises and disruptions occur, they do so against the backdrop of 
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WKLVEURDGHUSDWWHUQRIFRQ¿GHQWHQJDJHPHQWZLWKRQH¶VVXUURXQGLQJV WKH\DUH
localized anomalies. Such experiences also involve a diffuse feeling of ease or 
FRQ¿GHQFHVRPHWKLQJWKDWLVQRWORFDOL]HGLQDSDUWLFXODUSDUWRIRQH¶VERG\
The next step is to maintain that our more general sense of being rooted in 
DZRUOGVLPLODUO\FRQVLVWVLQDGLIIXVHVHQVHRISUDFWLFDOFRQ¿GHQFHVRPHWKLQJ
that I take both Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to be saying, albeit in different ways). 
([SHULHQFHKDVDQDQWLFLSDWLRQIXO¿OPHQWVWUXFWXUHZKLFKRSHUDWHVDVDQDOOHQ-
YHORSLQJ EDFNGURS WR PRUH VSHFL¿F VLWXDWLRQDO HQJDJHPHQWV H[SHULHQFHV DQG
thoughts (Ratcliffe, 2015, 2017a). And the crucial point is that this structure is 
susceptible to change. Elsewhere, I have referred to its variants as existential feel-
ings (Ratcliffe, 2005, 2008, 2015). Emotions and moods might be thought of as 
LQWHQWLRQDOVWDWHVZLWKPRUHRUOHVVVSHFL¿FFRQWHQWVVXFKDVIHHOLQJKDSS\DERXW
p, angry about q, scared of r, or in a bad mood about s. That being the case, exis-
tential feelings are distinct from both. It is only in the context of a given existential 
feeling that intentional attitudes of one or another type are possible. For instance, 
one can only experience something as frightening in a world that incorporates 
WKHSRVVLELOLW\RI WKUHDWRIDQWLFLSDWLQJVRPHWKLQJDVVLJQL¿FDQW LQWKDWNLQGRI
way. Pronounced changes in existential feeling thus involve shifts in the kinds of 
possibilities offered by the experienced world. The world of depression can be 
characterized in terms of such shifts. There is a distinction to be drawn between 
tokens and types of experienced possibility. The following description of how 
things appear upon hearing that a friend will not show up for dinner is an example 
of the former:
What I was seeing then was not a green bottle, with a white label, with a lead cap-
sule, and things like that. What I was really seeing was something like the disap-
pointment about the fact that my friend would not come or about the loneliness of 
my evening. (Van den Berg, 1972, pp. 34, 35)
Here, a particular situation is experienced in the guise of disappointment, insofar 
DVFHUWDLQVSHFL¿FLQWHUSHUVRQDOSRVVLELOLWLHVSUHVHQWWKHPVHOYHVasXQIXO¿OODEOH
Nevertheless, one retains a sense that possibilities of that type remain and can be 
actualized in other situations. The loneliness is contingent and temporary; other 
such evenings are still possible. In contrast, people with depression diagnoses 
often experience the world as bereft of the relevant types of possibilities. It is not 
just this evening that appears in the guise of loneliness; the world offers nothing 
HOVH7R¿QGRQHVHOILQDGLIIHUHQWZRUOGLVWRLQKDELWDGLIIHUHQWSRVVLELOLW\VSDFH
This, more than anything else, is what people struggle to articulate. It should be 
added that labels such as major depression accommodate a range of different 
kinds of experiences. These include various different changes in a persons sense 
of the possible, along with other predicaments that do not involve such profound 
phenomenological disturbances. In most instances, though, major depression 
does involve some kind of shift in the types of possibility that are integral to the 
experienced world. Such shifts are also describable in terms of an altered sense of 
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µVHOI¶DXQLWDU\FKDQJHLQµKRZRQH¿QGVoneself in a world encompasses both 
self-experience and world-experience (Ratcliffe, 2015, 2017a).
3. Incarceration
0DQ\¿UVWSHUVRQDFFRXQWVRIGHSUHVVLRQVWDWHWKDWZKLOHGHSUHVVHGRQH¿UPO\
believes that recovery is not merely unlikely but impossible, that the world of 
depression presents itself as inescapable, eternal. This should not be construed 
LQWHUPVRIDVSHFL¿FEHOLHIZLWKDFLUFXPVFULEHGFRQWHQW,WH[SUHVVHVVRPHWKLQJ
much more pervasive: a loss of certain kinds of possibility from the world. The 
relevant experience comes in many subtly different forms. However, for current 
SXUSRVHVLWZLOOVXI¿FHWRFKDUDFWHUL]HLWLQDQDEVWUDFWVLPSOL¿HGZD\7DNHWKH
general possibility of things changing for the better. Even when a particular 
situation seems hopeless, we usually retain the sense that something in our lives 
could change for the better, the sense that this type of possibility remains. But 
now consider a world from which the possibility of things changing for the better 
is altogether absent: nothing is experienced as offering that possibility and one 
cannot even imagine a scenario where it might. More usually, a sense that things 
could change for the better is integral to the experience of ones current situation 
as contingent  a sense that it could change in ways that matter. Drained of the 
prospect of positive change, the world can offer up only more of the same or 
something worse. Hence, ones situation is experienced as inescapable, something 
that is often conveyed in terms of being imprisoned, entombed, trapped, encased 
in some immovable substance, or stuck behind a sheet of impenetrable glass.
The relevant experience is temporal in structure, more so than spatial. One 
cannot get out because the required types of temporal transition are no longer 
amongst the worlds possibilities. The same experience could be described with a 
number of different emphases. It is a change in how one experiences time: there 
is no future, or ones predicament seems somehow timeless. It is also a change 
in how one experiences ones body: no longer drawn in by worldly possibilities, 
the body is sluggish, cumbersome and conspicuous. And it is a loss of hope: one 
can no longer summon attitudes of the type hope. Interestingly, people not only 
offer descriptions that are consistent with this emphasis on possibility. Some also 
explicitly refer to possibilities and their absence. Here are some representative 
examples:
You cant see far into the future so you cant see aspirations or dreams. Everything 
I ever wanted to do with my life before seemed impossible now. I also would think 
that I would never get out, that Id be depressed forever.
 when depressed I see life as pointless and sometimes cruel. I cannot see any 
possibilities for change or improvement.
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The world seems pointless because when I am depressed I cant see the world in a 
positive way. All I see is a place full of suffering which I often feel I would be better 
off escaping from  I cant think positively.
When Im depressed life never seems worth living  I think that my life will never 
change and that I will always be depressed. Thinking about the future makes my 
depression even worse because I cant bear to think of being depressed my whole 
life. I forget what my life is like when Im not depressed and feel that my life and 
future is pointless.
0\HQWLUHIRFXVLVRQWKHQHJDWLYH,FDQQRWVHHDSRVLWLYHIXWXUH,RIWHQ¿QGP\VHOI
thinking I could be anywhere in the world right now, doing anything and I would 
still be desperately miserable.
The world holds no possibilities for me when Im depressed. Every avenue I consid-
er exploring seems shut off.
While certain types of possibility are gone from experience, others may be 
DPSOL¿HG )RU LQVWDQFH ZLWKRXW VLJQL¿FDQW SRVVLELOLWLHV IRU PHDQLQJIXO DFWLRQ
one might instead experience everything in the guise of threat: There are lots of 
threats in the world and they all seem to be about to happen, or be very likely they 
will happen. Loved ones are in danger. There are many variants but, in all these 
cases, what we have is a unitary change in the overall form of experience rather 
than a cluster of separable symptoms. And, having acknowledged this, we can 
EHJLQWRVHHKRZWKHLQWHUSHUVRQDO¿WVLQ
4. Connection
My central claim is that the loss of contingency from the world, the sense of ones 
predicament as inescapable, is identical to the feeling of estrangement from other 
people. So you cannot have one without the other. In brief, the anticipation of 
certain types of relations with other people imbues the world with a distinctive 
degree and kind of openness and uncertainty  what we might call a sense of 
there being self-transformative possibilities. Where such possibilities remain, one 
cannot experience ones current predicament as inescapable or ones current per-
spective as exhaustive. And, where they are lost, the world cannot but be drained 
of a certain kind of contingency. Although the relevant loss is not exhaustive of 
GHSUHVVLRQH[SHULHQFHVLWLVZKDWZH¿QGHPSKDVL]HGDJDLQDQGDJDLQLQ¿UVWSHU-
son accounts.
It is important to distinguish two things: (a) a sense of connection that we 
sometimes experience during interaction with other people; (b) the anticipation 
of interactions involving that sense of connection. First of all, I will suggest that 
(a) essentially involves a change in ones experience of possibilities, something 
that can be subtle and mundane or exceptional and profound. Second, (b) includes 
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a sense of the potential for this, and thus a sense of ones current perspective as 
LQFRPSOHWHRSHQWRSRVVLELOLWLHVWKDWFDQQRWEHIXOO\VSHFL¿HGLQDGYDQFH
Various philosophers have noted -in one or another way- how, when we inter-
act with another person, the two parties inevitably affect one another in a cer-
tain, distinctively personal manner (something that can be especially salient in the 
context of psychotherapy). This does not demand conscious attention and is not 
something one can willfully avoid. We are inevitably permeable to one anothers 
LQÀXHQFH7KURXJKDQLQWHUSOD\RIH[SUHVVLRQWRQHDQGJHVWXUHZHVROLFLWYDUL-
ous affective responses, and these responses are inseparable from how the wider 
world is experienced. The Danish philosopher, Knud Løgstrup, describes this as 
follows:
By our very attitude to one another we help to shape one anothers world. By our 
attitude to the other person we help to determine the scope and hue of his or her 
world; we make it large or small, bright or drab, rich or dull, threatening or secure. 
We help to shape his or her world not by theories and views but by our very attitude 
toward him or her. (1956/1997, p. 18)
Interpersonal processes thus alter the possibilities offered by our surroundings  
both immediate and the longer term possibilities. At one extreme are experiences 
resembling what Sartre calls shame, where one loses ones possibilities in the face 
of another: I grasp the Others look at the very centre of myDFWDVWKHVROLGL¿FD-
tion and alienation of my own possibilities (Sartre, 1943/1989, p. 263). However, 
there are many other ways in which people affect one another, and the point to 
note is that all interpersonal encounters exert at least some degree and some kind 
RILQÀXHQFHKRZHYHUVXEWOHDQGWULYLDOLWPLJKWEHLQDJLYHQFDVH7KHUHOHYDQW
experience is especially pronounced and also has a certain, distinctive character 
in those cases where there is sustained, patterned interaction between two or more 
parties, involving feelings of mutual connection. Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009) 
refer to an experience of mutual incorporation, where the two parties form a 
coupled system; the interaction between them structures both their understanding 
of each other and also how they experience their shared surroundings. Comple-
menting this, Fuchs (2013) describes a kind of bodily resonance that shapes 
interpersonal interaction, fostering a sense of connection in ways that shape wider 
experience and thought.
Such phenomenological claims are complemented by other sources of evi-
GHQFH LQFOXGLQJYDULRXVHPSLULFDOVFLHQWL¿FVWXGLHV$VXEVWDQWLDOERG\RIHYL-
dence indicates that actual and anticipated interactions with others, and even the 
PHUHSUHVHQFHRIRWKHUVLQÀXHQFHWKHSHUFHSWXDODQGSUDFWLFDOVDOLHQFHRIRQH¶V
VXUURXQGLQJV LQDSUHUHÀHFWLYH IDVKLRQHJ%D\OLVV)ULVFKHQ)HQVNH	7LS-
per, 2007; Becchio, Bertone, & Castiello, 2008; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 
2006; Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009). Others have proposed that certain regulatory 
processes are not internal to the human organism but interpersonally distrib-
uted. Bereavement and other circumstances can thus involve the withdrawal of 
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VSHFL¿FVHQVRULPRWRUUHJXODWRUV¶VRPHWKLQJWKDWPD\LPSDFWGUDPDWLFDOO\RQKRZ
a person experiences and interacts with her surroundings (Hofer, 1984, p. 188). 
Also of relevance is a substantial and fast-growing body of literature on emotion 
regulation (e.g. Gross, 1999, 2001, 2014). Regardless of how we might think of 
emotion, it at least seems safe to say that emotions are involved in experiences 
RIVLJQL¿FDQFHDQGVDOLHQFHDQGE\LPSOLFDWLRQH[SHULHQFHVRISRVVLELOLW\,W
can be added that, even in adulthood, emotion-regulation is not a wholly inter-
nalized process. We interact with the social environment in a range of ways that 
serve to regulate our emotions (Colombetti & Krueger, 2015; Krueger, 2018). In 
particular, interactions with other people play a key role (Diamond & Aspinwall, 
2003; Gross, 2014). They can nurture or fail to nurture feelings of connection, 
which are themselves prerequisites for other kinds of emotional change that shape 
ones relationship with the surrounding environment (Ratcliffe, 2017a).
All of this is consistent with a variety of mundane, everyday experiences. 
$QH[DPSOH,RIWHQ¿QGP\VHOIXVLQJLQFRQIHUHQFHSUHVHQWDWLRQVLVWKDWRIWZR
different scenarios that can unfold when you take a visiting speaker out for din-
ner after a talk. In scenario A, the two of you hit it off straightaway and the 
conversation glides effortlessly from one topic to the next. As you walk home 
afterwards, your world seems enriched  it offers all sorts of possibilities, some 
more determinate than others, that you had not anticipated before the encoun-
ter and perhaps could not have anticipated without it. In contrast, in scenario B, 
WKHZKROHHYHQLQJLVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\PXWXDODZNZDUGQHVV±WKHUHLVQRÀRZRI
word, gesture, or expression; points are not followed up or developed; and, after 
DZKLOHHYHU\WKLQJVHHPVHIIRUWIXOGLI¿FXOW7KHVDPHUHVWDXUDQWQRZDSSHDUV
small, suffocating, drained of possibility. And, as one heads home, everything 
seems somehow depleted, diminished.
Interactions with other people can thus shape and re-shape, in various ways, 
the wider possibilities offered by our surroundings. Importantly, these include 
self-transformative possibilities of a kind that cannot be anticipated in a deter-
minate way. Turning to (b), it can be added that, in anticipating interaction with 
others, what we anticipate includes the potential for such relations (which is not to 
suggest that we ordinarily conceptualize or articulate it as such). What we antici-
pate from the interpersonal is distinctive in kind; it is essentially indeterminate, to 
some degree unpredictable. (This is not to make the strong claim that only other 
people can ever offer certain types of possibility. Rather, the proposal is that there 
is a qualitative difference between the kinds of possibility ordinarily offered by 
other people and those ordinarily offered by inanimate entities and non-human 
organisms.) It is partly for this reason that we frequently seek consolation from 
trusted others when bad things happen. Interaction with them can involve re-con-
VWUXLQJWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIUHOHYDQWHYHQWVLQZD\VWKDWRIWHQFDQQRWEHDFFRP-
plished alone and are not merely a matter of obtaining concrete opinions, advice, 
or practical support. Other people thus imbue the world with a distinctive degree 
and kind of openness and spontaneity, a sense that this is not all there is, that the 
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possible is not exhausted by those concrete alternatives that I am currently able to 
entertain. This is something that our experience of the world more usually takes 
for granted, but it is notably absent in many cases of depression. This absence is 
central to the relevant experiences.
Granted, loss of possibility in depression can extend beyond what is implied 
by a loss of interpersonal connection. Arguably, one does not have to be capable of 
anticipating interpersonal connection in order to anticipate enjoying an ice cream. 
A loss of anticipated pleasure can thus be further-reaching. Nevertheless, many 
other aspects of depression-experience are implied by loss of connection: a loss 
of possibilities from the world more generally (including all of those anticipated 
pleasures that do implicate interpersonal connection in some way); a sluggishness 
associated with practical disengagement from the world; a change in the sense 
of time, involving a loss of openness from the future; loss of a hopeful attitude 
towards the future. Conversely, without this disconnection, the world could not 
incorporate the profound loss of possibility, hope, and an open future that many 
people with depression diagnoses describe.
5. Disconnection
First-person accounts of depression are in many respects quite varied. This 
should come as no surprise  the kinds of criteria employed to diagnose depres-
VLRQDORQJZLWKPRUHVSHFL¿FFDWHJRULHVRIGHSUHVVLRQDUHFXUVRU\DQGSHUPLV-
sive. Hence, they are highly unlikely to identify a single, unitary phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, a consistent theme in almost all accounts is the intimate connection 
between loss of possibilities from the world and an absence of interpersonal con-
nection. Although many accounts refer to an impenetrable barrier between self 
and others, the experience is seldom just that of being cut off, unable to make 
contact. Along with this, other people often continue to present certain other pos-
sibilities, such as threat, disapproval, condemnation, or humiliation. In all cases, 
though, what is diminished or altogether lacking is a sense of the potential for a 
certain type of interpersonal connection:
I feel less connected to people around me  completely alone even in a crowd  
They seem more distant and collectively living their lives around me, as if I am not 
an active participant in my life.
I assume my family dislikes me and that everyone is looking at me and thinking 
what a terrible person I am. I begin to feel as if my friends arent real and secretly 
they see what I see in myself which is horrible.
I would sometimes describe it as though I was wearing tinted glasses when I was 
feeling depressed. My best friends and family could appear to be enemies, I would 
fear them sometimes, that they would hurt me, that they no longer liked me. Or, I 
would, when trying to drag myself out of those feelings make them appear vulner-
able, that it was in fact me that could hurt them, and that I needed to protect them 
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from my thoughts and actions, I would then distance myself, which would make it 
even harder to feel better.
There is often an emphasis on ones own inadequacy, worthlessness, or failed 
moral character, coupled with either the threat of other people discovering it or 
its being on display for all to see. Alongside this, one may dread, fear, or be sus-
picious of other people in general. In many cases, there is also anger towards 
others. Sometimes, there is alternation between blaming oneself and blaming oth-
ers. Indeed, self-denigration often seems to translate effortlessly into criticism of 
others: I am a burden / they wont tolerate me; I am worthless / they dont value 
me; I am alone / they have abandoned me; I cant achieve anything / Im not sup-
ported. For example, often I feel angry with family and friends but that changes 
almost immediately to self-loathing that I could think that way about loved ones. 
This is reminiscent of Freuds famous discussion in Mourning and Melancholia 
(1917/2005), at least insofar as Freud proposes that self-denigration can amount 
to a veiled criticism of others (Ratcliffe, 2015)
Interpersonal experience in depression often involves a further tension. It is 
not simply that interpersonal possibilities are absent from experience. More often, 
the felt absence of these possibilities is itself a salient aspect of the experience. 
And, in many cases, one does continue to anticipate certain forms of interpersonal 
connection. However, in seeking them out, one is confronted with a world where 
there is no prospect of actualizing them, comparable to needing a drink in a desert. 
7KHUHLVWKXVDFRQÀLFWEHWZHHQVHHNLQJWRHQJDJHZLWKDQGWRUHWUHDWIURPWKH
social world: I feel lonely if I withdraw but it feels hard to be around people.
Distinctions should therefore be drawn between various ways of being 
estranged from self-transformative interpersonal possibilities. Someone might 
no longer seek interpersonal connection, continue to seek it but experience its 
consistent disappointment, anticipate disappointment but seek out connection 
UHJDUGOHVVRUFRQWLQXH WRQHHGFRQQHFWLRQEXW¿QG WKH LQWHUSHUVRQDOZRUOG WRR
terrifying to venture out into. The latter is consistent with something else that is 
RIWHQPHQWLRQHGDSHUYDVLYHORVVRIPRUHXVXDOO\KDELWXDOSUHUHÀHFWLYHµWUXVW¶LQ
other people: I close away from the outside world, I get a feeling of being scared 
to go out in case I see someone I know. I dont trust the world around me when I 
am depressed. When especially pronounced, this may also be described in terms 
of paranoia:
I am incredibly negative and paranoid  I cant walk around a shop without feeling 
that everyone is staring at me. I am convinced that everyone hates me. I feel isolated 
and that no one understands me. I feel as though I have no friends and I am bad at 
my job. I feel like Im wasting my doctors time.
When I was depressed, I also became much more paranoid. I assumed that if a friend 
didnt text me back after a few minutes, they hated me. Tiny off-hand comments 
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would make me believe even my own mother hated me. I always assumed that the 
root of this hatred was my awful personality. I thought that the other people in the 
building I lived in (even those I didnt know) were making fun of me behind my 
back. It sounds ludicrous now, but thats how I genuinely felt at the time.
Lack of trust, in such cases, is not a localized attitude towards however many 
people. It is an all-enveloping shift in what one anticipates from others, who no 
longer seem predictable or dependable. This is closely associated with a wider 
sense of the world as turbulent, unstructured and uncertain. If you cannot depend 
on other people, then you cannot depend on social norms, items of equipment 
maintained by others, information they provide, and so forth. Erosion of trust can 
DOVRH[WHQGWRWKHHI¿FDF\RIRQH¶VRZQDFWLRQVWRRQH¶VERGLO\IXQFWLRQVWRWKH
reliability of ones thoughts and feelings; and to the integrity of ones sense of 
self. It is here that we start to see a blurring of the boundaries between experiences 
typical of depression (of one or another kind), post-traumatic stress disorder, 
schizophrenia and other diagnoses. All can be fuelled by much the same form 
of social alienation, involving the erosion of a primitive, non-localized, habitual 
form of trust or FRQ¿GHQFH (Ratcliffe, 2017a).3
6. Implications
What I have said implies that the establishment of interpersonal connection is not 
incidental to the treatment of depression but unavoidably integral to it, and indeed 
central (see also Ratcliffe, forthcoming). Establishing and nurturing a sense of 
connection that someone experiences as absent implies the transition from the fro-
zen world of depression to a world that is imbued with meaningful contingency.4 
Hence a pressing issue to address is that of how to distinguish between different 
forms of estrangement, which may be amenable to different kinds of responses. 
Consider a case where the prospect of self-transformative interpersonal connec-
tion is altogether absent from experience, where the person cannot even imagine 
such a scenario unfolding. We cannot rule out the possibility that this aspect of 
experience is veridical, that he really is impervious to certain interpersonal pro-
cesses. On the other hand, the relevant experience might turn out to be less robust. 
Regardless of how compelling the sense of certainty may be at a given time, it 
could be something that waxes and wanes, perhaps depending on situational fac-
tors. To put it in terms of (a) the experience of interpersonal connection and (b) 
the anticipation of this experience, it is possible for (b) to be wholly absent, even 
though something remains of the capacity for (a). Indeed, it is quite conceivable 
for someone to experience something as utterly impossible and then to accom-
plish it with ease, when somehow coaxed into an appropriate course of action. 
Hence, one issue to explore is that of when and how certain kinds of interpersonal 
process might facilitate (a) in the absence of (b), in ways that can also assist in 
re-instilling a sense of (b).
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$QRWKHUUHOHYDQWFRQVLGHUDWLRQLVWKHOHYHORI¿UVWSHUVRQLQVLJKWWKDWLVSUHV-
ent. The need to understand what is happening is often a prominent theme in 
¿UVWSHUVRQ DFFRXQWV ,Q WKH DEVHQFH RI YDULRXV NLQGV RI VLJQL¿FDQW SRVVLELOLW\
from the world, a type of curiosity, even an urge to make sense of ones predica-
ment, sometimes remains. People often emphasize the lengths that they have gone 
to in pursuit of understanding:
Ever since I realized I probably had depression (long before I was diagnosed), I did 
all I could to understand it.
I have read a countless research on the internet and own a couple of books about 
CBT and anxiety/depression. I talk to my GP, university mentor, and counsellor. I 
have also spoken to many mental health professionals.
Furthermore, such accounts often display a remarkable level of insight. For 
instance, they may acknowledge distinctions between feelings of certainty and 
propositional judgments, distinctions that elude some experts:
The other thing I really struggle to communicate is how my emotive and rational 
thoughts interact with one another. I can rationally think I shouldnt feel like I 
am worthless and still have an emotive thought I am worthless. Describing how 
WKRVHWZRWKLQJVFRKDELWLQWKHPLQGLVGHHSO\GLI¿FXOWDQG,KDYHQRUHDOZRUGV
to describe how those things relate to one another. There is not a simple causal re-
lationship between one emotion and one thought, the relationships are far, far more 
FRPSOLFDWHGWKDQWKDWEXW,VWUXJJOHWRGH¿QHFOHDUO\+2:WKRVHHPRWLYHUDWLRQDO
interactions go on.
Importantly, such insights into ones condition can also feed into the project of 
self-regulation:
Ive looked on a lot of websites, Ive read books about depression, Ive seen various 
doctors. I feel that my understanding of depression now is quite good. I wanted to 
IDPLOLDULVHP\VHOIZLWKLWDVPXFKDVSRVVLEOHVRWKDW,FRXOG¿QGDZD\RXW7RZDUGV
the end of my recovery, while I was at university, I did several projects on depres-
VLRQEHFDXVHLWZDVVRPHWKLQJ,ZDVLQWHUHVWHGLQDQGWR¿QGRXWPRUHDERXWLW
So an especially pressing question is that of whether, when, and how the intellec-
tual acknowledgement that there are other possibilities can retain some hold over 
a person, despite an overwhelming feeling to the contrary. Having established that 
it is a trick, perhaps there is some prospect of overriding it:
We can then see that it is not necessarily REAL what we are experiencing but just 
another habitual, repetitive experience that has come back to draw us in again. The 
more time we CHOSE to invest in these experiences the worse we are going to 
feel. We can learn to recognise that these mental happenings will come back time 
and time again and that they rarely change their ugly tune at all! Get THIS and you 
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are then in a position to say hmmm, fuck that...you know today Im going to give 
myself a break from that horror movie and clean my bedroom, or wash the car, or 
anything but that! There really is a mental training that HAS to go on for people 
who suffer with depression, and this responsibility is their own and ONLY their own 
because we are the only ones that can do it and we owe it to our wonderful selves 
and the lovely people around us to live a good and happy life.
Where there is some potential to erode a feeling of certainty and inescapability via a 
better understanding of its nature, this need not be a task undertaken by the solitary 
individual. As applies more generally, other people can assist in nurturing a sense of 
contingency that is currently lacking. A problem, however, is that the nature of the 
relevant experience, the loss of possibility and consequent sense of inescapability, 
LVVHOGRPDSSUHFLDWHGE\RWKHUV$VQRWHGHDUOLHU¿UVWSHUVRQDFFRXQWVRIWHQUHPDUN
WKDWLWLVERWKGLI¿FXOWWRFRQYH\WRRWKHUVDQGGLI¿FXOWIRUWKHPWRXQGHUVWDQG
7KHWKLQJDERXWEHOLHYLQJWKDWQRRQHUHDOO\OLNHVPHLVGLI¿FXOWWRFRQYH\ZLWKDQ\
real understanding. Ive only recently really started to understand it myself, and I 
feel like when I do try to explain it to someone they either dont really believe me 
(or the extent of my feelings) or they think that Im trying to get them to reassure me 
that they really do like me (which is not really what Im going for). Maybe people 
KDYHWURXEOHXQGHUVWDQGLQJLWEHFDXVHWKH\DFWXDOO\GROLNHPHDQG¿QGLWKDUGWR
believe that I dont believe them.
If someone already feels utterly cut off from other people in general, she will be 
disposed towards experiencing them as indifferent, uncaring, or failing to under-
stand. So it is arguable that the perceived lack of understanding is illusory and 
itself symptomatic of the depression. There is no doubt some truth to that. Even 
so, it is plausible to suppose that certain aspects of depression-experiences are 
indeed routinely misunderstood. And what I have referred to in terms of world 
is the prime example. It is rarely explicitly acknowledged, something we tend to 
concern ourselves with only when it is shaken. Consequently, shifts in this aspect 
of experience are prone to being confused with something comparatively super-
¿FLDO
2WKHUVKDYHRIWHQPLVLQWHUSUHWHGP\EHKDYLRXUDV VKHHU OD]LQHVVDQGVHO¿VKQHVV
It is extremely hard to explain to somebody who has never experienced depression 
exactly WHY you are so reluctant to get out of bed.
The worst was trying to convince people that the problems I had wouldnt just go 
away if I really were using positive thinking. Basically people considered it to be 
my fault and that any time I didnt like something or didnt agree with someone 
elses opinion I was just being negative which wasnt the case. I am a very optimistic 
person who thinks the best of people by nature.
I wish there were centres for the depressed, open 24 h a day, somewhere to escape 
to without the risk of judgement!
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Thus, a particular challenge one faces in engaging with someones experience of 
depression is that of acknowledging the potential for profound phenomenologi-
cal differences between the two parties, in a way that might be recognized as such 
by the other person. The point also applies to clinical empathy more generally 
(Ratcliffe, 2017b). Various authors have suggested that it involves not so much 
experiencing what someone else experiences as being open to potentially pro-
found differences between the two parties. In receipt of this acknowledgement, 
a person may, as Havens (1986, p. 24) puts it, light up in recognition of your 
sudden presence in their lives; they feel found, and not in the sense of found 
out or criticized. Margulies (1989, p. 12) similarly emphasizes how empathy 
requires the capacity to go against the grain of needing to know. Likewise, the 
task involves not imposing the world of the non-depressed upon the world of the 
depressed, with all the misunderstandings that this would entail.
This kind of recognition can plausibly contribute towards the goal of mak-
ing recovery a collaborative project. Once some initial sense of connection is 
achieved, further possibilities for collaborative self-regulation are opened up. For 
instance, other people can assist in the construction and revision of self-narra-
tives, of a kind that might either sustain or re-shape certain forms of experience. 
Radden (2009, Chapter 10) distinguishes between symptom-alienating and 
 symptom-integrating conceptions of depression, where the former sees depres-
sion as distinct from the self, while the latter takes it to be inseparable. Narratives 
of both kinds have potential regulatory roles to play, as does their revision. For 
instance, a self-integrating narrative along the lines that Im depressed because 
Im a useless, horrible person who deserves it plausibly impedes self-regulation.
All of this is, I admit, somewhat speculative. And the points raised in this 
section require considerable further development, including some account of how 
WKH\PLJKWUHODWHWRPRUHVSHFL¿FWKHUDSHXWLFDSSURDFKHV%XWZKDW,KDYHDWOHDVW
sought to show is how (a) the structure of many depression-experiences is essen-
tially interpersonal; (b) the interpersonal is inextricable from the overall form 
of experience; and (c) a sense of certainty and inescapability, central to many 
depression-experiences, is to be understood in interpersonal, relational terms. To 
recover from depression is, amongst other things, to recover an openness to cer-
tain types of possibility, which are inseparable from the prospect of certain types 
of interpersonal relations.
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Notes
 1.  The DSM characterization of major depression is problematic in various other respects 
as well. For instance, it has been argued that it fails to distinguish a range of important-
ly different predicaments (Ratcliffe, 2015), has undergone an unprincipled widening 
RIVFRSH+RUZLW]	:DNH¿HOG2007DQGWHQGVWREHPLVWDNHQO\µUHL¿HG¶.HQGOHU
2016).
 2.  The reference to E. M. Forster relates to the novel Howards End, Chapter 22.
 3.  See also Fonagy and Allison (2014) for a complementary emphasis on this form of 
trust, and for a discussion of its role in social development.
 4.  Although I consider some of the implications for treatment, I do not address whether 
and how my account might contribute to the formulation of causal explanations. For 
complementary developmental approaches that emphasize interpersonal dynamics, 
see, for example, Fuchs (2013) and Varga and Krueger (2013). However, it should 
be added that the essentially interpersonal structure of depression-experiences does 
not imply principally interpersonal causes; the causal pathways are likely to be many, 
diverse, and often very complicated.
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